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The Overcompensation Problem:
A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive
Payt
LINDA J. BARRIS*
I. TiE OVERCOMPENSATION PROBLEM
A. Introduction
Eighteen million, three hundred one thousand dollars: that was the total
1990 compensation paid to Stephen M. Wolf, the chief executive officer of
UAL Corp. (UAL), the parent company of United Airlines.' In the same
year, United Airlines showed a profit of only $95 million, 2 a 70% drop
from the prior year.3 Shareholders protested, activists stepped in to negotiate,
and eventually, UAL agreed to certain changes in its executive pay disclosure
practices. 4 In 1991, Mr. Wolf's salary remained at $575,000 and he declined
his 1991 cash bonus; but he did not turn down a stock option grant valued
at $2.235 million, part of a series of annual grants promised to him when
he took over the airline in 1987.5
Mr. Wolf's compensation is admittedly above the norm6 (he was the
second highest-paid executive on Forbes's 1990 list of highest-paid execu-
tives). But an ever-increasing number of his cohorts are surpassing the $1
t © Copyright 1992 by Linda J. Barris. All rights reserved.
* B.A., 1988, Gonzaga University, Spokane, WA.; J.D., 1992, University of San Diego.
1. What 800 Companies Paid Their Bosses, FORBES, May 27, 1992, at 236, 286-87
[hereinafter FORBES].
2. Id. at 287.
3. UAL to Disclose More on Exec Pay Under Accord with Shareholders Group, 24 SEC.
REo. & L. REP. (BNA) 44, 44 (Jan. 10, 1992).
4. Joel Chernoff, Pressure Builds on Executive Pay, PENsION & INVEM'MENT AGE, Mar.
16, 1992, at 3, 3.
5. Robert J. McCartney, UAL Links Executive Compensation to Stock Price Rise, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 1992, at C1.
6. Salary figures vary depending upon the reporting organization and the methodology
employed. The most frequently cited annual surveys are published by the American Management
Association, McKinsey & Co., Hay Associates, and Forbes. Forbes's annual list is the most
widely publicized, although the Hay report is more extensive. The latter is relied upon by the
Internal Revenue Service as well as litigants in discrimination cases. The American Management
report is a confidential report available only to members. Since many of the recipients of the
report are the decision makers on compensation issues, it may be the most influential in setting
next year's salaries. See Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets
or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247-48 (1983).
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million mark. 7 In 1990, Forbes put the average total compensation of top
executives at $1.592 million.' According to the Hay Group, a Philadelphia
consulting firm specializing in compensation issues, the typical 1991 salary
of American chief executives had grown to approximately $1.7 million.9
John F. Akers, chief executive of International Business Machines Cor-
poration (IBM), received a 185% raise for 1990. He received a bonus of
$600,000 and stock gains of $647,000, for a total bonanza exceeding $3.2
million. 0 In 1991, uneasiness over IBM's cloudy future prompted concerned
shareholders to call on Mr. Akers. That year his pay was trimmed to $1.6
million, a 40% reduction."
Meanwhile, at Sears, Roebuck and Company, chief executive Edward A.
Brennan refused his annual bonus "to reflect the spirit of the salary freeze"
that affected company employees in 1991.12 Although Mr. Brennan may
have turned down his annual bonus, he did not turn down his three-year
performance bonus valued at $391,206. This bonus was paid to him in
addition to his $979,847 base salary, and the $680,050 he realized by
exercising previously granted stock options. Add to this two grants of stock
options totalling 69,696 shares at an average exercise price of $30.44, plus
the grant of 12,098 previously restricted shares with a current market value
of approximately $543,000. In all, his total compensation package for 1991
was valued at approximately $3.6 million. 3 At the end of March, 1992,
Sears announced the elimination of another two thousand jobs. Since
August, 1990, the company, in an effort to reduce costs, has eliminated
43,150 jobs. 14
The seeds of these huge compensation packages were planted in the
excesses of the 1980s. Between 1971 and 1981 average executive compen-
sation grew by a significant but respectable 30% .15 During the frenzied
1980s, CEO compensation jumped by 212% while earnings per share on
the Standard and Poor's 500 Index grew by only 78%. In contrast, factory
7. According to the Forbes survey, 258 out of 800 top executives took home $1 million
or more in 1990. FoRBEs, supra note 1, at 236.
8. Id.
9. Linda Grant, Shareholders Balk at Shift in Executive Incentive Plans, L.A. TraMs,
Apr. 12, 1992, at DI, D7.
10. FORBES, supra note 1, at 262-63.
11. H. J. Cummins, Do Top Execs Deserve Huge Salaries?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29, 1992,
(Business), at 76, 68.
12. John Schmeltzer & Charles Storch, No Letup in Sears Job-Cutting, Cm. TRIB., Apr.
1, 1992, § 3 (Business), at 1 (quoting SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CoMPANY, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT
9 (1992)).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Geoffery S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentive
to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. RaY. 1147, 1149 n.7 (1985) (citing Executive Compen-
sation: Looking to the Long Term Again, Bus. WK., May 9, 1983, at 80, 81).
[Vol. 68:59
CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE PAY
workers' wages rose only 53%.16 In recession-plagued 1990, corporate profits
fell 7%, but the average CEO's total pay increased 7%,17 and while the
rate of inflation was 6.1%, factory workers received raises of just 2.8%.18
More than a few disgruntled workers and a contingent of shareholders are
once again taking a hard look at enormous executive salaries.
The clamor to control excessive compensation has grown so loud it can
no longer be ignored. If corporations do not remedy the situation, they
face the specter of increased shareholder revolt (manifested by calls for
ouster, sale of stock, or derivative suits for corporate waste); loss of
employee productivity (and concomitant decline in corporate profits); or
governmental action in the form of legislation to force pay ceilings.
B. Historical Perspective
Executive compensation packages have evolved during the last century in
response to changes in the structure of American firms. Gone are the days
of owner-managers; in their place is a cadre of professional managers and
a system of salaried executives. Most owner-managers preferred to take the
rewards of their hard work through stock gains on their investment.' 9
Salaried executives, on the other hand, had little incentive to provide services
at a level greater than that required to retain their positions. In response,
corporations developed incentive compensation plans based on some measure
of corporate profits.
The average earnings of corporate presidents during the early part of the
century, including incentive compensation, were considerably less than
$100,000.20 While most compensation plans were modest by present-day
standards, there are examples of huge rewards collected by a few executives.
One example, which prompted more than one shareholder lawsuit, involved
American Tobacco Company President George Washington Hill. 21 Mr. Hill
grossed $1.284 million and netted, after taxes, $1.050 million-in 1930
dollars.22
Executives receiving extra-generous compensation were shielded from scru-
tiny because compensation levels were kept as closely guarded secrets.2 3
16. John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90, 90.
17. Id. at 91.
18. Id. at 93.
19. Vagts, supra note 6, at 245.
20. Id. at 246. Mr. Vagts cites a 1938 study which found that the median compensation
of 100 top industrial CEOs was $69,728 in 1929. Id. at 246 n.63.
21. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.
1941), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
22. For a discussion of the calculations see Vagts, supra note 6, at 255 n.111. A bonus of
two and one-half percent of profits yielded President Hill $447,870.30 in 1929 and $842,507.72
in 1930. Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591. These payments were in addition to cash and fixed salary.
Id. at 585. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 245-46.
23. Vagts, supra note 6, at 245.
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After the stock market crash of 1929, shareholder litigation and bankruptcy
proceedings unearthed some of the previously hidden information. Appalled
shareholders filed lawsuits charging corporate waste, Congress conducted
hearings, and the Federal Trade Commission investigated. But the lawsuits
rarely resulted in victories, and no direct governmental action to curb
excessive compensation resulted; however, the sudden attention to a previ-
ously sacrosanct subject forced corporate directors to exercise more caution
when granting compensation packages, and pay levels were kept in check.
Due to economic conditions and other factors, including wartime salary
stabilization, 24 compensation remained relatively low during the next four
decades.
Although the government refused to directly control private sector com-
pensation, it did devise a way in through the back door-redistributing
wealth through taxation. Personal income tax levels have historically fluc-
tuated depending on the economic theories of the incumbent administration.
The top tax rate rose to a high of 91% in the late 1940s, settling in at the
70% range during the 1960s. 21 While the average executive earned consid-
erably more than the average worker, his proportionally higher tax rate
significantly reduced the disparity. Furthermore, the futility of awarding
huge salaries only to see them swallowed up by taxes helped to keep salaries
lower. 26
In the early 1980s, the average chief executive's paycheck was $624,996,
a sum which was forty-two times the pay of the average factory worker."
But then came the 1980s and the "Reagan Years." By 1990, the average
executive's earnings, exclusive of stock options, had risen to $1,214,090-
eighty-five times the salary of the average factory worker. 2 During the same
period, President Reagan's tax policies dropped the top rate from 70% to
2870,29 significantly increasing the disparity between worker/boss income
and also removing the "tax obstacle" to granting large salary increases. As
the 1990s unfold, corporate profits are declining and the real purchasing
power of the worker's paycheck is shrinking, but executive salaries continue
to rise. In an echo of the 1930s, the wisdom of enormous pay packages is
once again called into question.
24. Id. at 246.
25. Kevin P. Phillips, Reagan's America: A Capital Offense, N.Y. Tbm, June 17, 1990,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26. In 1920, the top tax rate was 73%. By 1925, the top rate had been
reduced to 25%. After the 1929 stock market crash and the advent of the New Deal, the top
rate increased to 79% by 1936 and then to 91% post-war. Id. at 28. In the 1960s, the top
rate again fell, first to 77%, then to 70%, where it remained stable until the 1980s. Id.
26. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 246.
27. Byrne, supra note 16, at 91.
28. Id. at 93.
29. Id. at 95.
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II. Tim EFFECTS OF COMPENSATION PACKAGES
Multi-million dollar compensation for top executives engenders an instinc-
tual negative reaction from the public and many shareholders. Corporations
justify these packages by claiming they are "paying for performance."
Executives justify these packages by claiming they should be amply rewarded
for steering their companies to profits. But do these plans effectively
accomplish that goal? Do sizable salaries actually make shareholders worse
off? Is the corporation hurt? This Part will begin with a review of the types
of compensation paid to corporate executives, turn to the justifications for
and criticisms of these packages, and finally look at the actual harm to
shareholders and the corporation.
A. The Structure of Compensation Packages
Compensation packages are as varied as the corporations which create
them. The particulars of how an executive's contract is structured are
determined by a combination of factors, including competitors' compensa-
tion plans, current tax laws, phase of a company's growth, and amount of
incentives the directors wish to give to top management. 0 But pay packages
tend to follow a pattern and usually will include most or all of the following:
Guaranteed salary
Benefits, such as life, disability, and medical insurance
Perquisites
Cash bonuses for attaining certain goals
Stock options
Termination compensation (golden parachutes)
Almost every publicly held corporation includes in its pay package some
type of incentive compensation in the form of bonuses and stock options.
The original idea behind incentive compensation was to align shareholder
and manager interests and to motivate and hold onto top executives. As a
stockholder, the executive has a vested interest in maintaining a profitable
company, in turn benefitting shareholders.
Cash bonuses are awarded to the executive for meeting short-term goals
such as landing a particular contract, meeting annual sales targets, or
maintaining a certain share value. These bonuses may be quarterly, annual
or biennial, or triggered by a particular event. 3' Stock options are the rights
30. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1151.
31. General Dynamics, for example, has a controversial bonus plan that pays bonuses
equal to one-half the annual salary for every $10 incremental increase in stock value maintained
for a period of 10 days. Robert J. MdCartney, A Most Unusual Executive Bonus Plan, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 21, 1991, at Al. See infra notes 54 and 170.
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to buy company shares at some future date at a pre-determined price 2 and
are geared toward promoting corporate growth over an extended period of
time. A balanced pay package will usually include incentives for executives
to meet both the short- and long-term goals of a company. In a properly
constructed plan, the executive will be motivated to activate the plan's
contingencies so as to receive the maximum reward.33 In theory, if an
executive works hard, stock value increases and everyone wins.
Stock option plans are the fastest-growing component of compensation
packages. Long-term incentives accounted for a third of total CEO pay in
1991, or about $500,000 of the typical $1.7 million salary.Y This compares
to only 8%, or $58,000, of a comparable $725,000 package in 1985.15 The
following table represents the changes in distribution of the typical pay
package between 1985 and 1991.36
TYPE OF COMPENSATION PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
1985 1991
Base salary 52% 35%
Long-term awards (options) 8% 31%
Annual bonus 22% 22%
Benefits 16% 11%
Perquisites 2% 2%
Figures regarding stock option compensation can be deceptive. The enor-
mous salary figures quoted in the press often result not from the present
award of compensation, but from the actual cashing in of stock options
previously granted. In that respect, the figures may represent an accumu-
lation of rights over several years which, exercised in one year, inflate the
compensation figures.37 On the other hand, there are clear exceptions.
Stephen M. Wolf, chief of UAL, cashed in $14.775 million in stock options
in 1990. Since he had only been with UAL since 1987,3s his average take
on stock options alone was huge by anyone's standards.
B. Justification for Incentive Compensation: Pay for Performance
Modern chief executives have awesome responsibilities. They must oversee
the management of tens of thousands of employees. They must balance the
32. For example, an executive may be given an option to purchase 10,000 shares of his
corporation's stock at $100 per share, the market price on the day the option is granted.
Assume that the executive holds the option for five years. If during that time the market price
has risen to $150, the executive may elect to exercise the option and purchase the stock at the
$100 per share "strike" price, $50 below the then-market price.
33. Vagts, supra note 6, at 240.
34. Grant, supra note 9, at D7.
35. Id.
36. Id. at D1 (citing Hay Group, Executive Compensation Database).
37. Byrne, supra note 16, at 93.
38. FoRas, supra note 1, at 286-87.
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conflicting demands of customers, lenders, workers, governmental agencies,
the press, and the public. They are under enormous pressure from Wall
Street and shareholders to increase share value. They must keep up with
the ever-increasing pace of technological change and the rush of foreign
competition.3 9 Chief executives are not interchangeable cogs; each has a
unique position with a tailor-made job description. 40 This, claim executives,
justifies high pay.
Another frequently cited justification for high corporate compensation is
the ballplayer analogy.4 1 Baseball players and rock stars take home multi-
million dollar pay with little comment. Chief executives make no more than
other highly compensated individuals, yet seem to be the lightning rod for
a more general anger about concentrated wealth and the rich getting richer.
4 2
Few people would object to executives being paid well. If a company has
the right CEO, with "energy, brains, diligence, daring, and capacity for
hard work," any salary would be a bargain. 43 But some critics are pointing
to a present lack of a connection between the performance of many
executives and the pay they receive. If executives are performing so well,
why are corporate profits stagnating or declining? Average corporate profits
dropped 7% in 1990 while average CEO pay rose 7%,M strong evidence
that executives are being rewarded in spite of performance, not because of
performance.
If an enormous salary is to be both equitable and palatable to shareholders
and the public, pay must be visibly related to the actual responsibility the
executive carries and the quality of the executive's performance. If an
executive receives a large annual bonus because the corporation showed a
profit, that profit should be traceable to a significant degree to the actual
efforts of the executive. This is where the ballplayer analogy strikes out. A
ballplayer or rock star makes millions because of his or her individual
talent. An executive, on the other hand, is just one player on a very big
team. Certainly he plays a leading role, but it is difficult to accurately
assess his individual contributions to an overall successful year. When a
ballplayer hits a home run, his individual contribution is obvious.
Incentive compensation is ideal in the abstract, but in practice it may not
function as anticipated. For example, bontses that reward executives for
reaching pre-defined goals are often tied to increases in stock performance.
But stock prices may vary due to external influences which pervade the
39. Byrne, supra note 16, at 92.
40. Vagts, supra note 6, at 237.
41. Cummins, supra note 11, at 76, 68.
42. Id.
43. Donald B. Thompson, Are CEOs Worth What They're Paid?, IhNusrRY WK., May 4,
1981, at 65, 65 (quoting U.S. Steel Vice President J. Bruce Johnston).
44. Byrne, supra note 16, at 91.
1992]
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economy as a whole or one particular industry.45 An executive may "earn"
a bonus simply because a market fluctuation occurred at the proper time. 46
A steady rise in profits over a period of years, the event stock options are
designed to reward, may flow from research breakthroughs or market
expansions begun in a predecessor's term. To complicate the matter, con-
tracts spelling out bonus plans are often extremely complex, and the measure
of whether a goal has been attained is usually a set of internally produced
accounting figures. As with any set of books, these figures are subject to
manipulation. In sum, a compensation plan aimed at motivation may in
fact reward an executive for lucky circumstance or crafty tactics instead of
individual effort.
If corporations justify their compensation practices by claiming to pay
for performance, there should be some assurances that executive fortunes
rise and fall with the company's. Many compensation packages are con-
structed so that the executive profits in good times and is protected in bad.
If stock prices decline, the executive may lose his bonus, but he may have
the ability to renegotiate the option portion of his existing plan to lower
the strike price, the price at which the option can be exercised. 47 Thus, the
executive is rewarded regardless of his or the corporation's performance
and is simultaneously insulated from the ravages suffered by fellow share-
holders if stock value declines.4
The growing use of incentive compensation suggests that corporations are
placing ever-increasing emphasis on executive performance. But sufficient
anecdotal evidence exists demonstrating that many plans do not properly
motivate and reward. Many of these plans, by design or defect, act to
enrich the executive without sufficient return to the corporation. These plans
involve substantial costs to the company, so if their existence is to be
justified by the claim that the company is paying for performance, it is
vital that payment be made only for measurable outstanding performance. 49
45. Vagts, supra note 6, at 241.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. A recent case causing controversy involves
Paul Lego, chairman of Westinghouse. His corporation suffered immense ($1.1 billion) losses
in 1991. Grant, supra note 9, at D7. As a result, Lego lost his 1991 bonus, but in April,
1991, he was given 350,000 shares of stock at a strike price of $28.56. Id. Unfortunately (for
the shareholders), the value of Westinghouse stock continued to drop, rendering Mr. Lego's
options worthless, so the board dipped into corporate coffers and produced another option
package of 350,000 shares, this time with the significantly lower strike price of $16.00. Id.
This replacement of option packages is not a new phenomenon. In 1979, a shareholders'
derivative suit was brought against Sears, Roebuck and Co. alleging waste of corporate assets
when the company twice called back stock options and replaced them with new options at
lower strike prices. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 1979). The court refused to
find any wrongdoing on the part of the corporation, noting the fact that the action was
approved by a significant majority of shareholders. Id. at 741.
48. Grant, supra note 9, at D7.
49. David Kraus, Executive Pay: Ripe for Reform?, HAsv. Bus. Rnv., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at
36, 44.
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C. The Harmful Effects of Overcompensation
1. The Effect of Compensation on Shareholder Wealth
In defense of their pay practices, companies often point out that the cost-
per-share of an executive's compensation package actually amounts to only
pennies, even with the extravagant salaries of some top executives. In 1990,
the 800 chief executives listed by Forbes earned $746 million in salaries and
bonuses, $232 million in other forms of compensation, and cashed in stock
options for an additional $296 million. In all, the executives pocketed a
total of $1.3 billion. But in the same year, corporations made profits of
$154 billion. Overall, executive salaries amounted to less than 1% of
corporate profits. 0
If even the largest compensation packages do not strip corporations of
assets, devalue the stock, or cheat individual shareholders of significant
sums of money, what then is the problem with granting generous salaries
and ample incentives? Is the current complaining over excessive compensa-
tion merely the "gut" reaction that executives make "too much money"? 51
Not necessarily. Incentive compensation generates some significant prob-
lems which harm corporations and in turn impact shareholder wealth. Two
of the most pressing problems are the perverse incentives created when
money is used to motivate the executive and the adverse incentives created
in demoralized American workers. And left unchecked, stock options could
proliferate until they do pose a serious economic threat to corporations.
2. Harming Corporations Through Perverse Incentives
According to generally accepted American corporate theory, the execu-
tive's goal should be to maximize firm value for the benefit of the corpor-
ation's owners, the shareholders. To facilitate this goal, bonuses are awarded
for increasing the firm's value (maximizing shareholder wealth), and stock
options are granted to align executive and shareholder interests. The two
incentives should act together to provide impetus to maximize both short-
and long-term corporate potential.3 2 At its most basic level, the granting of
incentives is based upon the "greed" principle: An executive will make
decisions which he believes will increase the value of his corporation's stock,
which in turn will increase his personal wealth. While the executive is busy
assuring his personal gain, he assures gain for all.
50. FoaRS, supra note 1, at 237.
51. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1152.,
52. Alfred Rappaport, Executive Incentives vs. Corporate Growth, HARv. Bus. Rv., July-
Aug. 1978, at 81, 84.
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In order to maximize his personal wealth, the executive has a perverse
incentive to focus on only those programs and factors most closely affecting
the amount of his compensation. Since his compensation depends on the
company's performance, and the company's performance is measured pri-
marily by earnings-per-share or market price,53 the executive has incentive
to do whatever is necessary to prop up this quarter's earnings or increase
the market price of shares. Instead of positioning the company for the
future, which is an important objective of shareholders, the executive's
attention is diverted to positioning the company to meet his own short-term
goals.m
These perverse incentives also engender poor decision making.5 5 Whether
the executive makes a short- or long-term decision will be affected by his
perception of the personal economic rewards of a particular action.5 6 Eco-
nomic rationality dictates that an executive weighing two competing courses
of action will choose the plan that will have significant impact on this
year's profits (and thus on his annual bonus) over one which may pay back
handsomely, but only after a number of years. Executive jobs are not
necessarily permanent. In 1990, there was a 20% turnover among CEOs at
Forbes 500 companies through death, retirement, relocation, and ouster.57
This fact provides added incentive to executives to make short-term, income-
enhancing decisions.
Managers holding pay packages heavy with incentives may become un-
willing to invest a firm's resources in forward-looking projects. Postpone-
ment of discretionary outlays, reductions in advertising, delays in employee
development programs, and other cost-cutting measures all contribute to
higher short-term earnings (and thus bigger executive bonuses), but adversely
53. Vagts, supra note 6, at 241.
54. One of the most blatant examples of this effect is the "$1.6 million speech" delivered
by General Dynamics's chairman, William Anders, on September 25, 1991. Anders told a
group of professional stock market analysts that earnings were up and the company was
planning to return its excess cash directly to the shareholders. McCartney, supra note 31, at
Al. General Dynamics's stock jumped $4 per share to close at the highest level in two years.
Id. What Mr. Anders neglected to mention was that the jump triggered a bonus equal to
double his $800,000 annual salary, or $1.6 million (guaranteed payment of one-half in 1994,
the rest at age 65). Id. All he had to do to receive the bonus was to keep the average stock
price above $45.56 for 10 consecutive days. Id. The speech did the trick.
While Mr. Anders counts his loot, General Dynamics is laying off workers, scaling back
production, and trying to reshape its business amid reduced defense spending. Id. The company
lost $578 million in 1991. Id. Corporate earnings were up due to spending cuts which could,
over time, cripple the company. Cummins, supra note 11, at 76. This bonus plan, as expected,
received harsh criticism because it motivates management to do whatever is necessary to raise
stock price in the short term at the potential expense of market share in the longer term.
McCartney, supra note 31, at Al.
55. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1148.
56. Rappaport, supra note 52, at 84.
57. FoRBEs, supra note 1, at 237.
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affect the future earning power of a company." Research and development
expenditures as a percentage of gross national product began to decline in
the 1970s, 59 and the trend has continued into the 1990s.60 Many critics
attribute the decline in long-term research, planning and business develop-
ment to management's preoccupation with short-term financial results and
efforts to boost short-term earnings and stock prices. 61 Research and de-
velopment expenditures are reduced because these expenses lower current
profits and only pay off in the future, if ever.62 "The easiest expenditures
to forgo are investments in the future." 63
Risk taking is also reduced. If a company embarks on a risky project
and loses, the loss is divided among the many shareholders so that each
only suffers a small decrease in wealth. A shareholder with an adequately
diversified portfolio will hardly notice. However, an executive whose com-
pensation package is chock-full of incentives may find his income signifi-
cantly reduced. Unlike the shareholder, he is unable to diversify these losses.
Consequently, a shareholder may be eager for the corporation to take on
risk, but the executive with performance-based bonuses may have powerful
incentives to avoid risk taking.6 Even though incentive compensation is
designed to align shareholder and executive interests, when it comes to risk
taking, those interests radically diverge.
Play-it-safe decision making, postponed capital expenditures, and by-
passed research and development are not always in the best interests of the
corporation, the shareholder, or the public. While not accusing all highly-
compensated executives of malfeasance, it is unrealistic to assume that
executives will always act in the best interests of the corporation when
corporate interests conflict with personal interests. A compensation plan
that focuses on individual greed cannot help but promote greedy conduct.
This conduct has a trickle-down effect which may not be fully realized by
the corporation or its shareholders for many years.
3. Demoralizing the Workforce
While the cost-per-share to the corporation for a multi-million dollar
compensation package is small, the cost to the firm in terms of human
58. Rappaport, supra note 52, at 82.
59. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1159.
60. Lipton, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of
Directors, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 187, 210 (1991). Between 1980 and 1985, there was an annual
rate of increase in American corporate research and development spending of 8.2%, but the
real increases averaged less than one-fifth that rate between 1985 and 1990. Id. (citing R & D
Spending Growth Continues to Slow, Rs. TECH. MOrr. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1990)).
61. See, e.g., Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1159; Rappaport, supra note 52, at 82; Lipton,
supra note 60, at 210.
62. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1159.
63. Lipton, supra note 60, at 210.
64. Rappaport, supra note 52, at 84.
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capital is far greater. Those same pay packages which provide executives
with incentives create disincentives for employees. Executive compensation
strikes at key economic issues: employee morale and productivity.
It is hard for American workers to feel part of the team when the CEO's
salary is eighty-five times the average worker's pay.65 While executive
paychecks have been increasing steadily, the "real earnings" for their
workers, adjusted for inflation, have been decreasing." At the same time
the executives are voting themselves huge raises, they are laying off workers.
When workers perceive that top management is on a "gravy train," morale
suffers, especially when hard times hit and the suffering is not shared. 67 As
workplace resentment rises, labor-management relations deteriorate.
There is more at stake here than just bad feelings. American competi-
tiveness is also suffering, due in part to employee discontent. American
manufacturing wages languish behind Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Can-
ada, Japan, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while executive salaries are
nearly double the pay of'any foreign peer,6s a detail not lost on American
workers. Production is a social undertaking, not an individual one. It
requires teamwork and trust, which is exactly what bloated executive pay-
checks erode. 69 Employees won't follow executives they cannot trust, and
they cannot trust executives who see to it that they are overpaid.70
Reining in executive pay will not have a direct impact on the competi-
tiveness of American firms, but it could boost employee morale and,
indirectly, make companies stronger. It is symbolic of a shared fate between
executives and workers.71 A few corporations are beginning to acknowledge
the correlation: an official of the Colgate-Palmolive company recently
admitted that the biggest barrier to teamwork is executive pay.72 But many
corporations continue to grant executive pay increases, generous bonuses,
65. Byrne, supra note 16, at 93.
66. For example, in 1990 the rate of inflation was 6.1% but the average factory employee
recieved a mere 2.8% raise. Even white-collar professionals were outpaced by inflation; they
recieved raises in 1990 of 5.2%. Only the CEOs, who on average increased their total take by
7%, managed to keep ahead of inflation. See id. at 91, 93.
67. Jonathan Rowe, CEO Pay Affects Company Morale, CmusrsN Scf. MoNrroR, Mar.
12, 1992, at 13.
68. Laurent Belsie, Executives Make Hay, but the Sun is Not Shining, CmusrTu Sci.
MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1992, at 8.
69. Rowe, supra note 67, at 13.
70. Byrne, supra note 16, at 90.
71. Belsie, supra note 68, at 8.
72. Rowe, supra note 67, at 13. Colgate-Palmolive CEO Reuben Mark grossed $1.907
million in 1991. Id. His company showed a profit of $321 million. Id. The company found
itself the target of United Shareholders Association which challenged the corporation on
governance issues, including compensation arrangements. Id. Colgate-Palmolive negotiated a
settlement rather than face an adversarial process. 23 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 532, 532,
Apr. 12, 1991. While the corporation may say it is responsive to workers' concerns, its true
concern may have been in avoiding shareholder revolt.
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and massive stock options while making regular announcements of cost-
cutting measures and layoffs.
4. The Production of "Stealth" Compensation
The increasing popularity of stock option awards (presently comprising
up to one-third of executive pay packages), poses a potential for economic
harm which may not yet be fully realized. In on-going legislative hearings
over compensation issues, incentive compensation has been termed "stealth
compensation."73
Each year, the typical company with a stock option plan grants new
options to its executives. These grants provide rights to purchase stock for
periods ranging up to ten years. Simple mathematics proves that, over the
years, the number of shares an executive holds outright through exercised
options, or which he has the potential to acquire, add up to a very large
number. Compensation analyst Graef S. Crystal74 likens annual granting of
stock options to a farmer planting crops-after allowing the newly planted
option seeds to germinate for a few years, it is time for the annual harvest. 75
The executive may not be willing to harvest during a year when stock prices
are unfavorable, but since he possesses inside information, he knows better
than anyone how his company is likely to perform and can plan his harvest
accordingly. If all else fails, the executive may be able to trade in his old
plan for a new one with a lower strike price.
According to Crystal, CEOs on average were given new options valued
at $1.66 million in 1990.76 If the stock market returns eight percent per
year from now on, and if the CEO exercises his option eight years after its
73. Graef S. Crystal, Stealth Compensation, FiN. WoRLD, Feb. 18, 1992, at 74.
74. Graef Crystal is an adjunct professor at the University of California at Berkeley
Business School and editor of The Crystal Report, a bimonthly newsletter on executive
compensation. Mr. Crystal happily admits he is a "turncoat." See John A. Byrne, Graef
Crystal: Is He Paul Revere or Benedict Arnold?, Bus. WK., Mar. 9, 1992, at 39. Once a
compensation analyst working for corporations, he now turns his pen against those he used
to serve. Until recently, Mr. Crystal wrote a column for Financial World in which he regularly
and zealously criticized compensation practices. He was fired on February 24, 1992. Id. Mr.
Crystal claims his firing came as a result of a mistake he made (and later retracted) in
calculating the pay of a certain CEO. Id. at 40. There are some who criticize his figures as
inaccurate, but those most critical of his accuracy tend to be the corporations who find
themselves the targets of his pen, and most of those claims are quibbles over the actual amount
a particular executive received. Id. Much of the difficulty with accuracy can be blamed on the
confusion created by the corporations themselves in their efforts to "bury" compensation
information. Id. Most of his detractors are more annoyed by his inflammatory style of writing
than with any inaccuracies in his work. Id. According to Crystal, what they fear most is his
vast insider knowledge of compensation issues. Id.; see also Allison L. Cowan, The Gadfly
C.E.O. 's Want to Swat, N.Y. Tnizs, Feb. 2, 1992, at Cl.
75. Crystal, supra note 73, at 74.
76. Id.
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grant, his gain will be $1.4 million on the 1990 grant. 77 Even if "option
growing" conditions are not as ideal in the 1990s as they were in the 1980s,
the executives will prosper-if they sow more seeds. And sowing more seeds
is just what they are doing as the size of these grants increases each year. 8
Coca-Cola's recent megagrant of one million shares to Chairman Goizueta
set a record as the largest individual grant to date.7 9 In March, 1992,
Paramount Communications awarded almost six million shares to top
executives. 0 Westinghouse gave two 350,000 grants to Paul Lego.81 Other
corporations granting options in 1991 in excess of 300,000 shares include
United States Surgical, AT&T, Equimark, Merrill Lynch, and Philip Mor-
ris. 8
2
Corporations have incentive to keep bonuses in check because large cash
payments have an immediate impact on the bottom line. Not so with stock
option grants. Because of the accounting methods currently employed by
corporations, a charge-to-earnings entry may not be made on the corporate
books when stock options are distributed.83 For this reason, the true cost
of these options are hidden from both shareholders and boards. 84
Current accounting rules permit companies to treat stock options differ-
ently from salaries or bonuses, which are charged directly to compensation
expense and come out of earnings. A shareholder looking at the annual
report can probably decipher the amount of direct compensation the exec-
utives are receiving, but it is not so easy to determine the amount of
compensation earned through stock options or the potential future cost to
the corporation when the options are exercised. As long as the prearranged
exercise price of a stock option is no less than the market price on the date
the options are issued, companies do not need to take a charge on their
books, s even though the options may some day be used to buy stock at
77. Id. Mr. Crystal uses IBM as an example. Id. at 78. In 1990, it issued options on 5.3
million shares carrying a likely average strike price of about $108 per share. Id. If the stock
price increases in the future at the rate of eight percent per year, and if IBM's executives
exercise their options eight years after the grant date, IBM will incur a pretax cost of about
$500 million, the sum that executives will take as option profits. Id.
78. Id. at 74.
79. Grant, supra note 9, at D7.
80. Id. at DI.
81. Id. at D7.
82. Id. It should be noted that these awards are for one year only and do not include
grants received in previous years nor take into consideration any future awards-which are
sure to follow.
83. Crystal, supra note 73, at 74. If IBM were to charge the $500 million to the income
statement, the company's aggregate eight-year, after-tax earnings would have declined by about
3%. Id. at 78. While this in itself is not a large sum, IBM will undoubtedly make more,
larger option grants during the next eight years. For example, in 1989 it granted options on
4.6 million shares. In 1990, that total increased to 5.3 million shares. Id.
84. Id. at 74.
85. Allison L. Cowan, Executive Stock Rule Considered, N.Y. Tums, Jan. 22, 1992, at
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below market prices. As a result of this loophole, many companies' net
income figures do not reflect the often generous stock options their execu-
tives receive. s6 It has been estimated that United States corporations are
overstating their income by two to three percent on average by neglecting
to charge themselves anything for the stock options they award.,, The
increasing popularity of these options could make this percentage grow
sharply.88
Mr. Crystal predicts that, left unchecked, the average option gains at the
end of the 1990s will have tripled to about $2.9 million per option grant. s9
In light of Coca-Cola's one million share award and other recently an-
nounced stock megagrants, Mr. Crystal's figures could be conservative. The
future costs to shareholders of the grants which are now being handed out
like candy is potentially staggering. The potential social costs cannot be
estimated or ignored as executives start cashing in these megagrants and
report earnings of 100 or 200 times the average worker's pay, instead of
the eighty-five times that is causing consternation today.
The ability of large option grants to change company performance for
the better is questionable. Crystal and other critics have attempted to
measure the relationship between the size of option grants and the company
stock price after the option was made. 90 The result of most of these studies
indicate no significant correlation between a company's future performance
and the size of an option grant.91 Comparing the likely future costs to
shareholders of these huge grants with the benefits to the corporation, the
continued award of this form of compensation in these amounts is a highly
questionable practice.
III. SOLVING THE EXEcUTmW COMPENSATION PROBLEM
The current outcry over excessive executive compensation will undoubtedly
cause some changes in the methods used by some corporations to recompense
Dl. Cowan notes that stock options may not be a "free lunch" since company earnings per
share usually fall when the options are exercised because of the greater number of shares
outstanding. Id. at D12. But the dilution in circulation does less damage to a company's
bottom line than a straight charge to earnings. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Graef Crystal, You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet, FIN. Woam, Oct. 1, 1991, at 74. Crystal
uses as his base executives who have for the last three years received option grants averaging
$1 million, and assumes the executive holds an option for 10 years with stock prices rising at
8% per year. Id. He calculated the total compensation by multiplying the number of option
shares executives have been granted during 1990 by the strike price per share. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Mr. Crystal measured the relationship over a four-year period between the size of
CEO option grants and company stock price performance after the option grants. Id. He
reports that there was no statistical significance or correlation between the company's future
performance and the size of the executive's option grant. Id.
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top personnel. A few have responded to criticism by reducing pay. IBM,
Westinghouse, and Eastman Kodak Co. are three examples of corporations
that have announced cuts in executive paychecks.Y But what is taken away
one year can be put back the next; reactionary measures are not necessarily
permanent solutions. Furthermore, the current cuts may not be all that they
seem; they may merely reflect a shift from one type of compensation to
another with a less-than-meets-the-eye reduction in executives' real earn-
ings.9 3 Instead of applying band-aids to remedy a hemorrhage, corporations
must effect lasting changes from within, lest they find changes forced from
without.
A. Internal Corporate Solutions
The board of directors has the power to make decisions on all matters
affecting the "business and affairs of the corporation."94 By long-established
rule, the setting of executive salaries falls under the umbrella of "business
and affairs of the corporation" and thus the directors acting as a body
have the right to fix the compensation of the executive officers.93 Ideally,
corporations would police themselves and take the necessary steps to control
excessive or inappropriate compensation. While some companies do have
strict policies which keep compensation within a predetermined range,9 it
is naive to believe that the corporate directors who presently abuse the
system will approve reductionist proposals beyond window dressing.
Recognizing that the approval of their own pay packages leaves executives
open to charges of self-dealing, every major corporation has emplaced
92. Michelle L. Johnson, Forget the Rhetoric-Executive Pay Fell For Many in '91,
INvsSToR's Bus. D~Ay, Mar. 13, 1992, at 8.
93. Westinghouse cut its chairman's compensation by more than $1 million after the
corporation lost $1.1 billion in 1991, id., but he did receive two grants of stock options at
350,000 shares each. The first grant is presently of little, if any, value, but the second grant,
if exercised at March, 1992 stock prices, would give Mr. Lego a profit of $1.225 million. His
$1 million "cut" in pay looks more like a $225,000 increase. Robert J. McCartney, Stock
Options Soften Bite of Executive Pay Cuts, WASH. PosT, Mar. 11, 1992, at Fl. Stock values
must remain above the $16 strike price for Mr. Lego to realize a gain on his options; on the
other hand, if the stock value drops, the corporation could award Mr. Lego additional stock
options at a still lower strike price. See supra note 47.
94. See DEL. GEN. CoRP. L. § 141(a) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incor-
poration.").
95. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 671 (Sup. Ct. 1941), affd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(App. Div. 1941).
96. One frequently cited example of corporate restraint is Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc.,
the Vermont-based ice cream company. Ben & Jerry's restricts top executives to no more than
seven times what the lowest paid full-time employee earns. Under this formula, co-founder
Ben Cohen earned only $85,100 in 1991. While Mr. Cohen's salary may be capped, he is by
no means pauperized by this corporate rule. Mr. Cohen owns $18.65 million in company
stock. Cummins, supra note 11, at 68.
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internal mechanisms to superintend the compensation process. Unfortu-
nately, these arrangements add a mere patina of respectability without
adequately addressing the admittedly complex issues surrounding executive
compensation.
1. Compensation Committees and Outside Directors.
In essence, compensation decisions are the ultimate in self-interested
transactions. Self-interested transactions are exchanges between a corpora-
tion and one or more of the corporation's directors or senior executives.
97
These transactions require (1) that the director or executive make full
disclosure to the corporate decision makers who authorize the transaction;
and (2) that the transaction be fair to the corporation.9 8 But compensation
matters differ from other self-interested transactions in two respects. 99 First,
the appropriate level of compensation is an individual matter which must
take into account personal talents and characteristics of the executive and
the unique nature of the corporation.' ® Finding the market value of these
services is, admittedly, more difficult than finding the market value in a
typical self-interested transaction setting (such as establishing the fair market
value of personally-owned real estate which a director proposes to sell to
the corporation). Second, unlike other types of self-interested transactions,
compensation is an absolutely necessary transaction.'0 While other types of
self-interested transactions may be avoided so as not to raise the specter of
self-dealing (for example, the corporation need not buy that particular piece
of real property), compensation transactions cannot be avoided. For these
reasons, compensation matters are generally treated differently than other
self-interested transactions. So long as full disclosure is made and the
compensation is approved by disinterested directors, it will be reviewed
under the business judgment standard' °2 with only a cursory review, if any,
for fairness to the corporation. 0 3
As one means to satisfy the requirement of disinterested director approval,
most publicly held corporations have formed compensation committees,
usually composed of three to five outside directors who review, analyze,
and approve or revise compensation proposals. These proposals are gener-
ated internally or on behalf of the corporation by outside pay consultants;
97. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CoRn. L.
997, 997 (1988).
98. Id. at 998.
99. Id. at 1006.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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committees themselves rarely initiate the plans.104 After review, the com-
mittee forwards its recommendations to the board of directors which then
enacts the plan as written or modifies it as it feels appropriate. So long as
the board does not greatly deviate from the committee's recommendation,
the business judgment rule should protect the decision.
The composition of these committees negates any pretense of their im-
partiality or ability, while the corporate environment in which these teams
operate provides a playground for groupthink.'05 It is not unusual for chief
executives to sit on one another's compensation committees in the capacity
of outside directors.'06 These CEOs may approve increases for friends
because they expect the favor will be returned,10 7 or simply because the
corporate environment in which they operate approves of lavish spending
on top executives. So much for impartiality. As for ability, these committees
suffer several handicaps, including: (1) Because the committees are composed
of other executives, not compensation specialists, they often lack technical
expertise in compensation issues; (2) Time constraints preclude a thorough
analysis of extremely complicated contracts; (3) As outsiders, they seldom
know enough about a company's inner workings to effectively review
corporate plans and objectives or evaluate executive performance; and (4)
They rely heavily on outside consultants who in turn are hired and fired
by the CEOs whose pay packages are under consideration, making their
recommendations suspect. 0
104. Kraus, supra note 49, at 37.
105. "Groupthink" is a rationalization process resulting in "lockstep" behavior by indivi-
duals who will not speak their mind or disagree with the group for fear of upsetting the boss
or the status quo. The comforts of unanimity and perceived requirements of loyalty to the
group ensure that no one raises embarrassing questions or attacks weak arguments. See Daniel
Goleman, Insights Into Self-Deception, N.Y. Tns, May 12, 1985, § 6, at 40. The more
amiable the espirit de corps among members of the policy-making group, the greater the
danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink. Id. at 40. It most
often occurs when certain conditions exist: The group members know and like each other; the
group is insulated from outsiders; stress levels are high because of the need for a swift decision;
and the leader has made clear at the outset what the preferred choice is. J. Edward Russo,
Decision Traps and How to Avoid Them, CuwcAML ENGINEERING, May 1991, at 181, 181.
See generally IRviNG L. JAms, GROUPTIHNIC (1983).
106. United Airlines, frequently criticized for its compensation practices, reveals in its March
28, 1991 proxy statement that its compensation committee members are: Chairman John
McGillicuddy, CEO of Manufacturers Hanover Corp. and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
(also a director of Continental Corp. and USX Corp.); Juanita Kreps, economist and former
Secretary of Commerce (also a director of AT&T, Armco, Chrysler, Deere and Co., Eastman
Kodak, J.C. Penney, and Zurn Industries); Fujio Matsuda, Executive Director of Research
Corp., University of Hawaii (also a director of First Hawaiian, Inc.); James O'Connor, CEO
of Commonwealth Edison (also a director of American National Can Co., Coming Inc., First
Chicago Corp., Midwest Stock Exchange, Scotsman Industries Inc., The First National Bank
of Chicago, and The Tribune Co.). UAL CORP., Mar. 28, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT at 14
(1992), available in LEXIS, Compny Library, Proxy File [hereinafter PROXY STATEMENT].
107. Sen. Carl Levin, Address to the Luncheon at the United Shareholders Meeting (Nov.
15, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew file.
108. See Kraus, supra note 49, at 37; Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1153; Levin, supra note
107.
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In searching for solutions to compensation committee problems, tinkering
with the composition of the committee seems to offer few answers. Even a
compensation committee made up entirely of outsiders who do not sit on
the boards of other corporations and only marginally operate within the
corporate environment (thus in theory avoiding the impartiality and social-
ization problems) may provide scant protection against the granting of
inappropriate compensation packages. A committee thus composed would
suffer the same handicaps as a committee of insiders: lack of adequate and
unbiased information, lack of time, and lack of incentive. Since independent
nondirector committee members would serve part-time and have little or no
financial stake in the firm, it can be argued that CEOs would be even more
dominant and less accountable in setting salaries if a majority of the
committee lacks the knowledge or incentive to challenge senior manage-
ment.109
A committee composed of compensation specialists would be no better.
While specialists may have access to better information and expertise and
could propose their own packages instead of relying on management pro-
posals, corporate socialization factors and the self-preservation instinct creep
back in. Since compensation analysis is a narrow specialty, it operates in
its own social sub-group where large salaries are the accepted norm. Ad-
ditionally, any compensation specialist would quickly see that his or her
continued presence on the board is dependent upon his or her continuing
approval of pro-management packages. Salary and bonus increases would
likely become institutionalized, and compensation packages in such a system
would have no greater guarantees of accuracy in reflecting executive ability
or performance.
In short, no matter what their composition may be, these committees
have neither the information nor the necessary incentives to implement
effective contracts. They offer either blind approval of the proposal sub-
mitted to them, or rely on formulas which purport to pay for performance
but seldom reward effectively. As presently constituted, the committees are
too much a part of the corporate institution to effectively control compen-
sation. It is unlikely many compensation abusers will take wholly voluntary
actions to slash excessive compensation or realign incentive compensation
to accurately reflect "pay for performance." At the very least, these
committees should have their own legal counsel and independent consultants
with no ties to management." 0
As one prong of their current reform movement, institutional investors
are addressing the issue of compensation committees."' The investors want
109. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vim. L. REv. 1259,
1282-83 (1982).
110. Byrne, supra note 16, at 96.
111. See discussion infra, Part III.C.1.
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the committees to be composed entirely of independent directors"' 2 instead
of the mix of insiders and outsiders found at many corporations. This is
only a partial solution which, by itself, offers little protection against
spiraling compensation awards. Regardless of who sits on the committee,
whether insiders, outsiders, or independent consultants, it is the CEO who
signs their paychecks. Any decision the committee makes will necessarily be
tainted by this fact. Independence is a step in the right direction, but
certainly no cure-all. The creation of independent committees must be
backed up with further incentives, provided either by the threat of share-
holder activism or judicial action, before any significant permanent changes
will be realized.
Once the compensation committee makes a recommendation, it is up to
the board of directors to approve the plan, with or without modifications.
To avoid charges of self-dealing and unfairness and to insulate the board
with the business judgment rule, only outside directors actually vote on
compensation packages. But again, institutional biases plague the process.
Outside directors who vote on the packages are often inside directors at
other corporations. Crossover directorships are not only common, they are
the norm."' The "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" attitude, if
not blatantly present, has to be lurking in the background.
Added to the problems of inherent bias is the fact that board members
are paid handsomely for their efforts. 14 Most corporations pay annual
retainers plus a fee (typically $1,000) for each meeting attended. On average,
outside directors are paid between $20,000-40,000 for what amounts to
112. Chernoff, supra note 4.
113. For example, the March 28, 1991 proxy statement of UAL discloses that every one of
its 15 board members sits on the board of at least one other corporation. PROXY STATmENr,
supra note 106, at 4-11. In total, these 15 UAL directors occupy board positions at approxi-
mately 50 separate corporations (not including UAL), ranging from AT&T to J.C. Penney,
USX, Chrysler, and numerous banking organizations. Id.
114. The Conference Board, a business-funded research group, surveyed 851 companies
regarding average pay for directors in 1991. The group reported a 10% increase for director
pay over the previous year. According to its survey, the average pay for directors of
manufacturing firms was $27,200; for financial firms, $23,400; and service companies weighed
in at $23,640. Another survey by the consulting firm Hewitt Associates found higher figures:
$39,774 for industrial firms; $35,278 for service companies; $32,033 for banks; and $30,498
for utilities. Bill Barnhart, Recession Doesn't Dampen Raises for Corporate Directors, Cm.
Tam., Mar. 10, 1992, at Cl.'
In a not atypical plan, UAL discloses in its March 28, 1991 proxy statement that it pays its
directors an annual retainer of $20,000 plus a $1,000 fee for each meeting attended. Members
of certain special committees receive an additional retainer of $3,000 and a fee of $1,000 for
each committee meeting attended. Officers who are also directors do not receive retainers or
fees. Non-employee directors are eligible to participate in retirement income plans and may
have surviving spousd benefits available. Each director, his or her spouse, and his or her
dependent children are entitled to free transportation on the airline with reimbursement by the
corporation for any income. taxes resulting from the taxation of the airline benefits. The
average cost of these latter benefits for each director in 1990 was $9,472. PRoxY STATaENT,
supra note 106, at 15-16.
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about two weeks of work.' 5 If an executive is sitting as an outside director
on two or three boards, he or she may take home an extra $100,000 per
year; thus there is little incentive to rock the boat. It goes against reason
to expect a board member to take a contrary stance on compensation issues
if he or she wishes to be renominated the following year. It is even more
unlikely that any permanent change in compensation practices will be
instigated by this body without threat of action from other quarters. While
some boards are reducing pay, these reductions should be scrutinized to
determine if they are merely cosmetic or temporary.
This is not to say that every board and committee of every corporation
acts every time out of avarice, routinely approving unjustified remuneration.
Many corporations can and do approve reasonable compensation packages.
But in the last two decades, compensation has steadily increased, and in
some instances skyrocketed, despite the advent of compensation committees
and increased emphasis on disinterested board approval. It is clear these
systems offer at best only a leaky bulwark to stem the tide of rising
compensation, if indeed they offer any protection at all.
2. Legislative Solutions to the Internal Control Problem
If corporations do not rectify the overcompensation problem by imple-
menting internal changes, some legislators are willing to force the issue.
Legislation is pending which would disallow tax deductions for compensation
in excess of certain pre-established levels. 16 While these bills do not require
corporations to reduce compensation, they could make it expensive if
corporations do not.
Legislation sponsored by U.S. Senator Tom Harkin would amend the
Internal Revenue Code to redefine the term "reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation" to include only the first $500,000O 17 A
second, similar bill introduced by Thomas Daschle includes cost-of-living
adjustments to the $500,000 figure."' A third bill, the Income Disparities
Act of 1991, would deny deductions for "excessive" salaries and bonuses,
with "excessive" defined as an amount equal to twenty-five times the lowest
compensation paid to any employee." 9
The theory behind these bills is simple: Public policy does not support
extreme distortions in income distribution, and taxpayers should not have
to subsidize high-level executives through business tax deductions.12 The
115. Barnhart, supra note 114.
116. As of April 15, 1992, six compensation-related bills were pending before Congress.
117. S. 2329, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
118. S. 2261, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
119. H.R. 3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Sabo).
120. 137 CoNG. REc. E2727 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Sabo).
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Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regularly examines closely held corporations'
pay schedules and disallows excessive pay on a case-by-case basis. These
bills would extend this scrutiny to public corporations.12'
These bills are not without their critics. Commenting on Representative
Sabo's bill, Ralph Whitworth, executive director of United Shareholders
Association, stated this approach is "wrongheaded because it doesn't address
the central issue, which is pay for performance. It's not how much [exec-
utives] get paid, it's how they get paid."'' Further, it is unrealistic to think
that these top executives will take a pay cut ranging up to several million
dollars in order to save the company a tax deduction. The shareholder will
be hit twice: once by excessive compensation and once by losing the tax
deduction.'2
The bills suffer from further defects. The Income Disparities Act is flawed
because it applies only to salary, wages, and bonuses. If a corporation
wishes to preserve both its high compensation and its income tax deduction,
it may concentrate on awarding stock options, perquisites, or some other
form of compensation that escapes the label "salary, wages, and bonuses."
Ingenuity knows no bounds when the challenge is to beat the IRS. Senator
Daschie's proposal would apply to "salary or any other compensation" but
does not further define "other compensation."'2 Senator Harkin's bill
extends its reach to "the combined amount of any compensation, whether
in the form of cash or otherwise, paid to such employee including the value
of any property which is transferred to such employee."1' If the language
of these latter bills is construed to include stock options, there is a further
problem: the bills provide no mechanism for the valuation of options, and
no uniform method presently exists to accomplish this. Without a standard
system for valuation, a corporation could shift the emphasis to stock
options, then devise a valuation plan assigning the least possible value to
the options to preserve the largest possible share of tax deductibility.
If legislation of this type is enacted, a company wishing to pay its
executives in excess of the prescribed limits need only explain to its share-
holders that adequate business justifications exist to sacrifice the deduction.
If a sufficient number of corporations exceed the limit, a board need only
point to those companies and argue that its pay must be competitive to
attract and retain the best executives. In such an environment, it is unlikely
the legislation will work any miracles on excessive compensation.
This type of legislation is tempting in that it seems to confront most of
the evils of overcompensation. It takes aim at the disparity in pay between
121. 138 CoNG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1992) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
122. Johnson, supra note 92, at 8.
123. Id.
124. S. 2261, supra note 118.
125. S. 2329, supra note 117.
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worker and boss which contributes to the demoralization of the American
worker. It controls the perverse incentives created by excessive bonuses and
stock options. But the effectiveness of these proposals will be seriously
undermined if corporations opt to forego tax deductions or if a cadre of
experts is unleashed to find a way around the restrictions in the statute. In
effect, these are merely voluntary compliance programs. But the alternative
to a voluntary approach seems to be direct legislative control of compen-
sation-in effect, a "maximum wage" to offset the workers' minimum
wage. Such a solution contemplates an overhaul of corporate governance
and political and social policies that is, at present, not on the horizon.
B. Judicial Action
If executives neglect or refuse to take action to control runaway compen-
sation, shareholders have the ability to take their grievances to court. But
potential litigants face one tremendous hurdle-the courts do not want to
get involved. Inevitably, citation is made to the business judgment rule to
avoid the sticky question of "how much is too much." Only a few cases
show the courts actually grappling with this question, and many of those
cases are short on analysis.' 26
1. Defining "Too Much" and the Business Judgment Rule
By a long established principle, the amount and type of compensation
paid to an executive in return for his services is considered within the
"business and affairs" of the corporation, which is managed by or under
the board of directors.1 27 Directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary
duty to the corporation and its shareholders,' 2 but the court recognizes
that in most cases the directors are more qualified to make business decisions
than are judges. 2 9 Absent any wrongdoing, the board's business decisions
will not be "fodder for in-depth ex post legal scrutiny."' 30 In compensation
matters, courts allow corporate boards wide discretion in setting the amount
and type of compensation to be paid to top executives and generally will
not substitute their judgment for that of the directors.' 31 A survey of the
cases indicates that courts rarely find sufficient wrongdoing on the part of
a board to merit such ex post review. So long as the directors take reasonable
procedural precautions in awarding pay, the board will gain for itself the
126. Vagts, supra note 6, at 252-53.
127. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
128. Id.
129. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 (lth Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 1458 n.20 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
131. Johns, 874 F.2d at 1458.
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protection of the business judgment rule: the presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.3 2
While there are relatively few cases involving direct challenges to the
amount of compensation paid to directors in large publicly held corpora-
tions, the courts that have taken on the issue have reached similar results.
In virtually every case since the turn of the century, courts have either
applied the business judgment rule and endorsed the compensation practice,
or simply thrown in the towel and refused to deal with the problem. One
court stated the rationale for avoiding the question thus:
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what
yardstick is to be employed?...
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but
openness forces the confession that the pruning would be synthetic and
artificial rather than analytic or scientific.... It is not timidity, however,
which perturbs me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for revising
these figures were I inclined to do so.... The elements to be weighed
are incalculable; the imponderables, manifold....
If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to
be made-executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry?
Radio artists? Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The
President of the United States?...
Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled
economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical
province. Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly
operated by its [sic] directors, with the observance of the formal re-
quirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation for its
officers is primarily for the stockholders. This does not mean that
fiduciaries are to commit waste, or misuse or abuse trust property, with
impunity. A just cause will find the Courts at guard and implemented
to grant redress.113
In sum, the courts are willing to "grapple" with compensation issues only
when the compensation practice is so egregious that it is patently a waste
of corporate assets.
In approaching a compensation case, the courts routinely look first to
whether the corporation made a proper "business judgment." If the cor-
poration followed a reasonable course of action in adopting a compensation
plan, the courts will then look to whether the payments constitute corporate
waste. If the answer to the second question is no (and it usually is), the
compensation practice is upheld.
132. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 872.
133. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(App. Div. 1941).
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2. Defining a Business Judgment
The requirement that a corporation make a "proper" business judgment
is essentially a procedural drill which requires salaries to be approved by
disinterested parties. So long as the recipient does not vote on the plan, the
business judgment rule will cloak the decision with the presumption that
the amount and type of pay awarded is in the best interests of the
corporation.
If a board of directors fixes its own salary without a vote of disinterested
directors, the action can be challenged as a voidable self-interested trans-
action, shifting the burden to the directors to affirmatively establish that
the compensation is fair and reasonable to the corporation."14 However,
ratification by the shareholders or the disinterested directors after the
disclosure of all material facts shifts the burden of proving unfairness back
to the challenging party. 33
A plan approved by a compensation committee comprised of independent
directors is prima facie subject to the protections of the business judgment
rule. 36 Unless it can be shown that the independent directors breached their
duty of loyalty or care, or that the resulting plan amounts to corporate
waste, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to
how much the executive should be paid. 37
3. The Corporate Waste Standard
Because of their great deference to the business judgment rule, courts do
not invalidate properly adopted compensation systems unless they constitute
corporate waste.' Waste is found only if inadequate consideration is
returned to the corporation. 39 But determination of the adequacy of con-
sideration is committed to the "sound business judgment of the corpora-
tion's directors."' 40 In short, whatever the corporation deems adequate, the
court will deem adequate.
Some courts purport to apply a reasonableness test to compensation cases
to determine if corporate waste has occurred, but this test is easily met. So
long as the compensation the executive receives bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the services rendered, the court will not invalidate the compensation
134. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979).
135. Id. at 740.
136. Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,868, at
90,872 (Del. Ch. 1988).
137. Id. at 6; International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989).
138. Johns, 874 F.2d at 1461.
139. Cohen, 596 F.2d at 739.
140. Id.
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plan. 141 If the corporation received no benefit, corporate waste is easily
found. But where the corporation received some benefit, a plaintiff attacking
a corporate payment has the heavy burden of demonstrating that no
reasonable businessperson could find that adequate consideration had been
supplied by the executive in return for the payment, 142 an extremely difficult
burden to carry.
The reasonableness analysis is complicated by the fact that compensation
is awarded for two purposes: to reward and to retain. If a compensation
committee is in place, the court will bow to the committee's conclusion that
the plan "reasonably" represents the amount of reward deserved and the
amount required to retain key employees. Absent a plaintiff's persuasive
proof which seriously questions the judgment of the compensation commit-
tee, or a clear showing of fraud or bad faith, the court will not further
inquire into the reasonableness of the decision. 43 In the end, even when
applying a reasonableness test, the court will find reasonable what the
compensation committee has said is reasonable.
Courts have modified certain compensation plans on technicalities'" and
invalidated others after finding no benefit accrued to the corporation.145
But, as yet, no court has found in any case involving a large publicly held
corporation that pay was so unreasonably high that its excess, by itself,
constituted waste. Nor has any court struck down bonus or option plans,
even if under their terms the executive received a disproportionate benefit.
4. Specific Applications
One of the earliest, and still most significant executive compensation
cases, Rogers v. Hill,'" involved a shareholder challenge of bonuses paid
to executives of American Tobacco Company. The suit asked the Court to
declare that the amounts paid were unreasonably large and requested a
determination of what would be "fair and reasonable compensation" for
the individual defendants. 47 The Court was troubled by the size of the
bonuses and, encouragingly, noted that the plan would not withstand
scrutiny if the payments were so large as in substance and effect to amount
141. Johns, 874 F.2d at 1461; see also Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) (citing
rule determining when payments to executives are gifts); Cohen, 596 F.2d at 739.
142. Cohen, 596 F.2d at 739; see also Johns, 874 F.2d at 1461 (listing four factors, one of
which a plaintiff must prove before a court will substitute its judgment for that of a board
of directors).
143. Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
144. See generally Vagts, supra note 6, at 253-54.
145. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952).
146. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
147. Id. at 585. The Court noted that the profit-based bonuses system had paid President
Hill $447,870 in 1929 and $842,507.72 in 1930, in addition to his salary. Id. at 591. Those
sums are enormous if computed to the present dollar value.
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to spoliation or waste of corporate property.'4 But the Court did not
establish any boundary between reasonable and wasteful, nor did it establish
any methodology to distinguish between the two. Instead, it sent the case
back to the district court to consider whether and to what extent payments
to the individual defendants constituted misuse and waste. Unfortunately
for the sake of precedent, the case was subsequently settled, divesting the
court of the opportunity to establish a rule. 49
A few years later American Tobacco was back in court, once again
defending its bonus payments on charges of corporate waste. In Heller v.
Boylan,50 the court stated that the bonus payments received by the chief
executive were "immense, staggeringly so,'n51 but balked at substituting its
judgment for that of the stockholders who had ratified the plan. The court
emphasized that the ruling in Rogers, which sent the case back to the
district court for determination of whether the payments were so large as
to constitute waste, was not to be interpreted as setting aside the regular
common law rule that the directors have discretion in determining compen-
sation issues. According to the Heller court, the court in Rogers was not
attempting to substitute its judgment for the discretion of the board; rather,
it was merely directing an inquiry to determine if the discretion had been
honestly and fairly exercised.1 2 The court went on to say that Mr. Hill was
an "able, astute, aggressive executive" and that "[m]any improvements in
the business are due to his sagacity and ingenuity."' 53 In refusing to strike
down the bonus plan, the court voiced the eternal problem: "Just how
much of the [company's] growth is due to Hill's leadership and how much
to causes beyond Hill's influence, it is not possible to fathom.... Whether
he was worth the $4,500,000 paid him between 1926 and 1938 only the
stockholders can judge; it was their $4,500,000."114
Stock option plans have received similar treatment in the few cases coming
before the courts. Exxon's stock option program was attacked 5, after the
corporation granted extensions of time in which to exercise options and
made other changes to the plans which benefitted the option holders.
Stockholders argued that the amendments amounted to gifts of assets
because the corporation received no benefit or consideration in exchange
for the amendments. 16 But the court found that the amended plans were
148. Id. at 590-91.
149. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (containing a history of this action,
and related actions filed by Mr. Rogers), aff'd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1941).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 671.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 675.
154. Id. at 675-76 (emphasis in original).
155. Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
156. Id. at 1155.
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"not defeated by the fact that there was no measurable and definite
consideration passing to the corporation. ' 15 7 In its opinion, what controlled
was the business judgment of the granting committees and the majority of
shareholders, who approved plans that the stock options would operate to
retain the employees and would, in the long run, spur all employees to
greater efforts, which could "only benefit the corporation." '58 The court
further stated that the only limitation on this doctrine is that there must be
some adequate assurance in the plans that makes it reasonable to expect
that the corporation will receive the contemplated benefits, that is, the
services of those key employees. 59
Not all option plans have been blessed by the courts. A Delaware court
struck down an option plan which gave the option recipients the right to
immediately exercise their options upon issuance and for a period up to six
months after termination of employment.160 The plan was deemed deficient
because these conditions did not reasonably insure that the corporation
would receive the contemplated benefits.1 61 This case, however, merely
addresses a defect in a particular plan; it in no way reflects a general
hostility toward stock options. Most option plans have been upheld. For
example, the Seventh Circuit approved a Sears, Roebuck and Co. plan
which allowed a reduction of option prices to meet declining stock values.'6
While these are just a few examples of the courts' treatment of compen-
sation cases, they do illustrate the general "hands off" approach the courts
have employed and give an indication of the likelihood of success a
shareholder may expect in bringing a derivative action to challenge excessive
or inappropriate compensation. So long as the corporation follows the
established pattern-proposal by a compensation committee followed by a
vote of disinterested directors (and approval of shareholders, if required)-
and the plan ensures that some consideration passes back to the corporation,
the court will undoubtedly validate the compensation plan without pausing
to determine the sufficiency of consideration or propriety of the amounts.
5. Excessive Compensation in Close Corporation and Tax Cases
The courts are not merely unwilling to determine the boundary between
acceptable and excessive compensation for large publicly held corporations,
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 657 (Del. 1952).
161. Id.
162. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 1979). The court stated:
[T]he reduction of an option price to meet declining stock value is not waste per
se and in fact may well be necessary to maintain the value of the originally
conferred benefits. Contesting shareholders, in order to overturn the ratified
discretion of directors, must therefore present sufficient additional evidence that
price reductions did more than maintain the intended value of the options.
Id. at 743.
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they also claim an inability to make such determinations. But courts have
resolved the issue of excessive compensation in hundreds of cases involving
close corporations and partnerships, and the Tax Court regularly decides
compensation matters. In those cases, courts manage to find a fair market
value for the services rendered.163 There are obvious differences in scale
between public and close corporations, and certain differences in purpose
between tax cases and derivative actions, but when stripped to the essentials,
the court is merely asked to evaluate whether or not the pay is reasonably
related to the tasks performed and the abilities of the performer. Since
courts have been able to grapple with this problem in other contexts, there
seems to be no real justification to balk at applying the same analysis to
public companies. In either large or small operations, clear abuses should
be recognizable.
In one example of a tax case, the compensation paid to executives at
Pffeifer Brewing Co. was questioned for "reasonableness."'' 64 The Tax Court
looked at comparative surveys of compensation paid within the brewing
industry and matched it with sales, administrative expenses, and operating
profit figures. It then factored in the value of the prior work experience of
the executives and other intangibles. In the end, the court found that
Pfeiffer paid top dollar, but thereby secured top performance. 65 The court
concluded the compensation was reasonable.166 This court seemed to be able
to find a "rational or just gauge" for analyzing compensation, a task which
the New York courts had previously found so troublesome. 67
The close corporation and tax cases demonstrate that the courts do possess
the ability to review compensation packages for fairness. If the court
purports to hold that compensation must "bare [sic] a reasonable relation-
ship to the services rendered,"' 68 it should examine that relationship itself-
instead of entrusting the matter to the questionable judgment of compen-
sation committees and "disinterested" directors. Not only is the court
capable of determining "how much is too much," but there is no rational
reason why a court cannot examine a compensation package to ensure that
"contingent schemes are not skewed so as to warp the judgment of man-
agement."'16 9 The court should go beyond a mere inquiry into whether the
corporation has followed the proper procedure and get to the ultimate
question of the appropriateness of huge compensation packages. Plenty of
tools are available to assist in the undertaking, including independent
163. See Vagts, supra note 6, at 255-57.
164. Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952).
165. Id. at 596.
166. Id. at 597; see also Vagts, supra note 6, at 258-59.
167. See supra text accompanying note 133.
168. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d at 1447, 1461; accord Rogers v. Hill, 289
U.S. at 582, 591-92; Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979).
169. Vagts, supra note 6, at 275.
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analysts and masses of comparative compensation data. If the court finds
compensation that is substantially out of line, it should not hesitate to
prune off the unjustified amounts or strike down incentive plans that do
not properly motivate. With compensation reaching astronomical propor-
tions, arguments that these payments reflect reasonable compensation for
services rendered are growing weaker and courts have the perfect opportunity
to act. If the courts begin to reject these plans, corporations will have no
choice but to take notice and take action.
C. Shareholder Action
Shareholders, as owners of the corporation, should be in the best position
to challenge executive excess. But cost, collective action problems due to
widely dispersed share ownership, and formidable SEC regulations are just
some of the roadblocks facing the investor who seeks change. And even if
shareholders are given the opportunity to participate, apathy or the proclivity
to "vote with management" may effectively halt reforms. 70
"[D]ispersed shareholders suffer from the same problems of collective
action as other politically disenfranchised people: (1) The cost of individual
action is high and unlikely to result in a commensurate reward, and (2) the
incentives toward collective action are inadequate."' 7' "Because no com-
pulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists in these circumstances [where share-
holders wish to oppose a management policy], and because no single
shareholder can capture the whole gain to shareholders generally from the
proposal's defeat, there will be insufficient incentive to organize opposi-
tion."172
To discuss all the ramifications of the "shareholder passivity problem"
is beyond the scope of this Article; however, it seems clear that the only
170. An example can be seen in the recent activity at General Dynamics. General Dynamics
is, of course, facing an uncertain future. In a special meeting of the shareholders held January
15, 1992, shareholders were asked to approve a 1992 compensation plan similar to the previous
year's, awarding more than $35 million in pay, bonuses, and options to 23 top executives. It
includes a pay package for CEO William Anders in excess of $9 million. Like last year's
model, the new plan rewards executives for increases in the company's stock price, but a new
clause in the 1992 plan provides for a reduction in compensation if stock value declines.
However, stock options awarded to the top executives can be re-priced to the advantage of
the executives if stock values fall; thus, the actual compensation to the directors will remain
stable.
Even in the face of the current controversy over executive pay in general, and mounting
criticism of General Dynamics' pay packages in particular, shareholders approved the plan by
an 85% majority. The only real opposition came from the California and New York pension
funds. Steven Pearlstein, Shareholders Approve General Dynamics Pay; Only Small Changes
Made at Special Meeting, WAsH. POST, Jan. 16, 1992, at D10, D14.
171. Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C.
L. REv. 1135, 1149 (1991).
172. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REv. 3, 44 (1988).
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practical way individual shareholders can acquire a voice in compensation
issues is through uniting. Several groups representing shareholder interests
have announced plans to target executive compensation issues, including the
United Shareholders Association and several pension funds. On their agenda:
linking corporate performance to compensation. 7 3 But the real impetus for
change may come from the growing power of the institutional investors.
1. The Emerging Voice of the Institutional Investor
As collective entities, institutional investors have amassed billions of
dollars in assets, giving them the power to exert substantial influence over
the companies in which they invest. 74 The top twenty pension plans and
largest money managers now hold more than 16% of the shares in the ten
largest U.S. corporations.' 75 Public, corporate, and union pension funds,
retail mutual funds, and banks now represent more than 40% of the equity
market. 76
Not all of these funds share the same reform agenda. Because mutual
fund managers have the ability (and desire) to move in and out of funds
quickly, and because of the competitive and highly liquid nature of the
assets, the likely focus of these investors is on quarterly or annual results.'"
Compensation issues are of relatively minor concern since these do not
generally affect the short-term market price. Managers of corporate pension
funds are unlikely to take a stand for obvious reasons. Bank fund managers
face fiduciary duty and conflict of interest problems which make them wary
of involvement. 7 But public pension fund managers are interested in long-
term growth 79 rather than just short-term gains or liquidity, so they have
a keen interest in rectifying the short-term myopia engendered by incentive
compensation. One of the most active and vocal proponents of corporate
reform is the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS).
This $64 billion fund holds about one percent of the shares in many Fortune
500 companies. 80
In the past, pension fund managers chose to remain "rationally ignorant"
of the details of a particular firm's operation, preferring to rely on the
173. Institutions May Use Negotiations More in 1992 to Change Corporate Governance, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 at 13, 14 (Jan. 3, 1992).
174. Barnard, supra note 171, at 1135.
175. Id. at 1140 (citing William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HAiv.
Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 71).
176. Id. at 1140-41.
177. Id. at 1142.
178. Id. at 1142-43.
179. Id. at 1142.
180. California Funds Likely to Oppose Champion, UPI, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
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Wall Street Rule and to sell when prices dropped. However, these funds
have grown to a point where the sheer volume of share ownership virtually
precludes their adhering to this Rule.'8' Now that pension funds have
adopted indexing, the "exit" option is being replaced by the "voice"
option-using their power and resources to encourage improvements in
company performance.'8 Having found the will to take on the corporations,
these institutional investors must now turn their attention to finding the
way.
2. Battling the Proxy Process
With the exception of certain stock option plans that require shareholder
approval, decisions on how much and what type of compensation executives
are to receive remains strictly a board prerogative. Disenchanted shareholders
face two options: either vote the board out of office or submit shareholder
proposals directing the board to take specified actions. Option one is fraught
with the enormous difficulty of gaining sufficient votes to oust the board,
compounded by the lack of meaningful alternative candidates. If sharehold-
ers "vote the rascals out," they will likely find themselves with a new set
of rascals with the same agenda. Option two, placing shareholder proposals
onto the ballots, is a more viable option because it requires only a vote on
one issue instead of promoting a shareholder coup. Shareholders have
increasingly sought this remedy. In 1986, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) received thirty-five proposals on compensation matters
for inclusion in corporate proxy materials.18 By 1990, that number had
grown to 110,184 many of which were sponsored by institutional investors
or shareholder action groups. The Council of Institutional Investors has
adopted a model shareholder proposal seeking an independent compensation
committee with the power to hire an outside consultant.185 Until recently,
however, the SEC considered these shareholder proposals to be "ordinary
business," which is not, according to SEC rules, of any concern to share-
holders. 1 6 Requests to place compensation proposals on the ballot were
routinely rejected by the SEC.
On February 13, 1992, the SEC announced a major change in its policy
regarding executive compensation issues. Effective with the announcement,
advisory proposals intended to express shareholder views on compensation
181. Barnard, supra note 171, at 1151.
182. Id. at 1152.
183. Press Conference with Richard Breeden, SEC Chairman, Fed. News Serv., Feb. 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Press Conference].
184. Id.
185. Chernoff, supra note 4.
186. Bachelder, Executive Compensation: Corporate Pay Responsibility Act, 206 N.Y. L.J.
3 (1991).
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matters would be treated as "major policy issues," which, unlike ordinary
business, are includable in proxy materials. 187 Concurrently with its an-
nouncement, the SEC issued ten no-action letters regarding already-submit-
ted shareholder proposals, requiring that the pending proposals be included
in the 1992 proxy materials.'88
The SEC's action was a preemptive strike aimed at preventing the passage
of legislation to force the SEC to make this change. In announcing the new
policy, SEC Chairman Richard Breeden said, "Hopefully, this decision will
bring a market solution to a market problem by allowing the affected
private sector groups-management, directors and shareholders-to resolve
the compensation questions in each company on a case-by-case basis without
government regulation."' 8 9
3. Legislating a Voice on Compensation Issues
The government regulation the SEC was trying to head off when it
adopted its new policy is Senate Bill 1198, the Corporate Pay Responsibility
Act.19° Introduced June 3, 1991, by Senator Carl Levin, the bill would,
among other provisions, amend section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to make shareholder advisory proposals on compensation issues
proper subjects for action by shareholders. In addition to Senator Levin's
proposed legislation, other bills with similar provisions have been intro-
duced.' 9' One bill, introduced by Senator Tom Harkin as a companion to
his bill limiting corporate tax deductions,'9 would allow shareholders to
submit binding proposals on compensation matters. 91
In remarks prefacing the introduction of his bill, Senator Levin stated
that the people who own the corporation should have some voice as to how
it is governed.?94 His bill, as well as a similar bill introduced by Senator
187. Press Conference, supra note 183.
188. The ten companies affected are Aetna Life and Casualty Co., Baltimore Gas and
Electric, Battle Mountain Gold Co., Bell Atlantic Corp., Black Hills Corp., Chrysler Corp.,
Eastman Kodak Co., Equimark Corp., Grumman Corp., and IBM. Compensation, Breeden
Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA),
Feb. 14, 1992 at A4, A5.
189. Id.
190. S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A companion bill was introduced simultaneously
in the House. H.R. 2522, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
191. S. 2030, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
192. S. 2329, supra note 117.
193. S. 2330, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Senator Harkin's bill reads, in pertinent part:
[R]ecommendations, binding proposals, binding and nonbinding criteria, and
policies or methods to be used in determining or providing for the compensation
to be paid to directors, the chief executive officer, or other senior officers of an
issuer of a security registered under section 12 of this title shall be proper subjects
for action by its security holders.
Id.
194. Levin, supra note 107.
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Cohen, 195 would not give shareholders direct authority over pay levels, but
only an advisory vote. The hope is, of course, that responsible boards will
heed the words of advice from their shareholders. If, however, an irrespon-
sible board disregards recommendations, 196 the legislation offers no remedy.
Stockholders would be left with the arduous task of either "voting the
rascals out" or pursuing a derivative action. In either case, it is questionable
whether the effort and expense required to challenge the incumbents would
be worth any monetary savings to the company.
Senator Harkin's bill presents a more controversial issue. His bill would
allow binding proposals to be submitted to the board on compensation
matters. This raises troubling questions regarding the respective roles of
shareholders and the board and the responsibility for corporate decision
making. Undoubtedly, it would be the institutional investor who would take
the lead in challenging pay practices. Institutional investors possess or can
acquire sufficient resources and abilities to make informed suggestions on
compensation matters and certainly should be given some voice in the
decision-making process. But to cure the defects in the present compensation
process by allowing institutional investors the opportunity to directly set
pay scales through binding proposals may be a step too far (assuming,
arguendo, any proposal, binding or non-binding, could garner sufficient
votes for passage). The role of institutional investors should be advisory,
not dictatorial. The bill proposed by Senator Harkin, by allowing binding
proposals but not limiting them in scope, could open the door to investor
influence well beyond what was intended.
The shareholder voting provisions of these bills have been largely mooted
by the SEC's policy shift, and it is questionable whether Congress will enact
such legislation in light of the SEC developments. Regardless, shareholders
now have the ability to voice their concerns to management; the outfall of
this new right remains to be seen. If shareholders remain apathetic or
continue to vote with management, no real change will be experienced. Even
the institutional investors, powerful as they are, do not own sufficient shares
to overcome an apathetic majority. But if corporations are flooded with
shareholder proposals, it will send a clear signal to boards that their actions
are under scrutiny. Whether this will lead to reductions in pay or improved
methods for distributing incentives-or simply prompt boards to produce a
better paper trail justifying pay increases-is unclear.
195. S. 2030, supra note 191.
196. Disregarding shareholders is not a wholly unlikely event. So long as the board
accompanies its actions with sufficient investigation, discussion, and rationale, fully docu-
menting and purporting to justify its decision to disregard the shareholder's advisory vote, the
board should receive the protection of the business judgment rule as the courts presently apply
it. See supra notes 126-69 and accompanying text.
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4. The "Informed" Shareholder and Information Obstacles
With the SEC's new ruling on shareholder proposals, the path is cleared
for shareholders to vote on compensation issues. But if shareholders are to
make intelligent decisions, they must possess sufficient comprehensible in-
formation on compensation practices. A portion of the shareholder apathy
problem can be attributed to a lack of meaningful data supplied by cor-
porations and the confusing manner in which it is presented.
Current SEC rules require disclosure of all pertinent information regarding
compensation, 197 but they do not necessarily require the information to be
easily digestible. Compensation tables indicating the amount of salaries and
bonuses paid to the top five executives must be included in the proxy
materials, 19 but the table need not include the value of stock options. While
option compensation must be disclosed, the corporation may do so in text
form. 19 Often, the text information is nearly incomprehensible. According
to SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, one major U.S. automaker's incentive
compensation plan was described in sixteen pages and required "a Ph.D.
in Finance to begin to understand what was paid." ° Even the information
that is disclosed may not adequately reflect the true state of affairs.
"[M]anagers may easily manipulate accounting figures to reflect higher
earnings for a given period,"2' thus justifying salary or bonus increases.
Senator Levin's Corporate Pay Responsibility Act contains a legislative
solution to the information dilemma. His bill contains a clause requiring
proxy materials to include clear and comprehensive information regarding
compensation, including single dollar figures for total compensation, esti-
mated present value of deferred compensation, and graphic representation
of compensation figures for the prior two years and succeeding five years.?
Additionally, the SEC is proposing revisions to its proxy rules that would
clarify and enhance the disclosure of current executive compensation pack-
197. Bachelder, supra note 186, at 4. Pending adoption of revisions to disclosure require-
ments, the SEC requires disclosure of the following: cash compensation in table form for each
of the five highest paid executive officers and all executive officers as a group; compensation
relating to long-term incentive compensation, including option plans; certain perquisites; and
certain types of termination arrangements (golden parachutes). Id.
198. Id.
199. Press Conference, supra note 183.
200. Id.
201. Rehnert, supra note 15, at 1158. One example cited by the author was the 1973 decision
of Chrysler's management to change inventory accounting methods to increase reported
earnings. While earnings did show an immediate increase, the gain was short-lived. Chrysler
had to pay more than $50 million in additional taxes as a consequence of its action and the
firm's market value dropped approximately $50 million after the facts were announced. Id. at
n.57. While this action was not necessarily taken to increase or justify salaries, it does illustrate
the ease with which corporations can juggle figures to achieve their ends.
202. S. 1198, supra note 190.
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ages, and it announced on June 23, 1992, that it will seek comment on
several revisions to its executive compensation disclosure rules.M
The-requirement of additional disclosure is without question a step in the
right direction. However, it is too soon to tell how effective any new rules
will be in better informing shareholders. Accounting figures are still subject
to manipulation, although too much tinkering could leave the corporation
open to charges that it has issued false or misleading proxy materials."4
The proposed SEC rules requiring justification for compensation programs
leave the crafting of those justifications up to the compensation committee
and its hired wordsmiths who can shape the explanation as best fits the
need. The individual shareholder-the one holding the voting power-may
be only marginally better informed. And it may be some time before any
changes take place. The pending legislation requiring greater disclosure may
die in Congress, in part due to the pendency of SEC rule changes which
require a lengthy hearing and public comment process, 2° thereby postponing
implementation of any changes to some indeterminable future date. Fur-
thermore, there are no guarantees that any or all of the SEC's proposals
will be adopted.
203. The SEC proposes that the disclosure of executive compensation be reformatted into
a series of tables and that the requirement that general descriptions of compensation plans be
dropped. SEC Proposes Proxy Reforms Including Exec Pay Disclosure, 61 U.S.L.W. 2014
(July 7, 1992). The summary table would provide an overview of each compensatory item paid
to the CEO and the four most highly paid executive officers over each of the three preceding
years. A separate table would disclose a range of potential realizable values for stock options
or free-standing stock appreciation rights, and the gain that would be realized if options or
appreciation rights were exercised when the stock price had appreciated by certain specified
percentage levels (50%, 100%, and 200%) from the market price on the date of the grant.
Id.
The SEC's proposal would also require compensation committees to issue written reports
discussing the specific factors affecting each executive's compensation during the last fiscal
year and explaining how the individual compensation package relates to corporate performance.
A graph would accompany the proposed report comparing the cumulative returns to the
company's shareholders over at least the last five years to the return on the Standard and
Poor's 500 Stock Index, and the return on either a nationally recognized industry index or a
peer group index. Id.
Finally, if a corporation's compensation committee is composed of other than non-employee
directors or if the corporation has an interlocking compensation committee, expanded disclosure
on executive compensation would be required. Id.
204. SEC Rule 14a: Solicitation of Proxies states:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement ... containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statement therein not false or misleading ...
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
205. Press Conference, supra note 183. The change in the SEC's treatment of shareholder
proposals was a change in policy only and could be implemented immediately since policy
changes, unlike rule changes, do not require public hearings or comment.
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The shareholder evaluating a compensation package is further hindered
by current accounting rules which work against a shareholder trying to
decipher the fine print and footnotes in the proxy statements. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles can be used to legally obscure the true size
and cost of option compensation. Information on stock options must be
disclosed, but not necessarily in a meaningful way because a company need
not take a charge to earnings when it issues stock options, as it must do
with cash compensation. 2° Consequently, net income figures for the cor-
poration may be overstated2 7 and the total amount of compensation an
executive is receiving may be artfully hidden in the text of the proxy
statements. 208 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which
oversees corporate accounting and reporting and fashions the nation's
accounting rules, ° is responding to pressure from institutional investors to
examine the issue and make revisions. But the FASB has tried this before.
In 1984, the Board's attempt to overhaul reporting requirements resulted in
such an outcry from corporations that the project was tabled pending
agreement regarding underlying concepts. 210 Such an agreement has not yet
been reached.
It appears the FASB will have to do something. Pending legislation
requires disclosure of information and a reduction of corporate earnings by
the estimated present value of deferred compensation,2 1 but there are no
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to accomplish this calculation.
While the SEC has the statutory authority to establish accounting princi-
ples, 212 the process would be greatly enhanced with the cooperation of the
FASB. The FASB claims it will need a minimum of two years to devise
rules that could require companies to recognize compensation expenses from
stock option plans, 2" but admits that at present there is no consensus at
the Board on how or when to value an option.2 4 On a cynical note, the
FASB derives more than a third of its revenues via donations from cor-
porations and accounting firms.2 5 Obvious conflicts of interest are present
and may, once again, delay or curtail efforts to change the system.
206. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text; see also Crystal, supra note 73.
207. Cowan, supra note 85; Crystal, supra note 73.
208. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
209. Accounting for employee stock compensation plans is governed by Accounting Principles
Board Opinion No. 25. Accotmruio FOR STOCK IssuED TO EPLOYEES, Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board No. 25 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 1972).
210. Cowan, supra note 85, at D12.
211. S. 1198, supra note 190.
212. Press Conference, supra note 183.
213. FASB Says New Employee Option Rules Will Take at Least Two Years to Complete,
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 13 (Jan. 3, 1992).
214. Cowan, supra note 85, at D12.
215. Id. at DI.
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The SEC has announced that it will "study" the adequacy of current
accounting rules for grants of stock options and that it will "suggest"
revisions to proxy rules to clarify and enhance the disclosure of current
executive compensation. 216 But, once again, because any revisions to re-
porting rules must pass through committee and public comment before
enactment, reforms may be mired in the process for a considerable time.
5. Negotiating Out of the Proxy Battle
Some institutional shareholders have found their power to influence
corporate governance has reached a level where companies are willing to
negotiate changes to avoid a messy proxy battle.217 Increased institutional
muscle-flexing comes at the same time shareholder activists are expanding
their campaigns on compensation reform. Institutional investors are focusing
on three issues: (1) placement of independent directors on compensation
committees; (2) better presentation of pay-related information; and (3)
disclosure of the methodology used in setting pay. 218
Shareholder activists and institutional investors have been exerting pressure
through a combination of proxy resolutions and negotiations. 2 9 CalPERS,
however, has temporarily abandoned proxy battles after private talks proved
more effective than shareholder proposals. CalPERS announced in October,
1991, that it would, on an experimental basis, concentrate on direct nego-
tiations with twelve corporations with respect to various corporate gover-
nance issues. Four of the companies have been specifically challenged on
pay practices: American Express Co., Dial Corp., IBM Corp., and ITT
Corp., 220 all corporations whose stocks performed poorly over the previous
five years.?' After this announcement, CalPERS quickly reached agreements
with ITT and American Express. ITT changed the structure of its compen-
sation package to more closely tie pay to corporate performance following
216. Press Conference, supra note 183. The SEC is approaching this problem with extreme
caution due to concerns that changes in accounting rules for valuation of stock options could
create new problems. Because this issue is of great significance, Mr. Breeden does not believe
that "any decision should be reached on a hasty or ill-informed basis." Id.
217. Institutions May Use Negotiations More in 1992 to Change Corporate Governance, 24
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 13 (Jan. 3, 1992).
218. Chernoff, supra note 4, at 34.
219. Id.
220. Other targeted companies include: Hercules, Inc., Salomon, Inc., and Time Warner,
Inc. (seeking independence for the board of directors); and Chrysler Corp., Control Data
Corp., Polaroid Corp., Ryder Systems, Inc., and USAir Group (seeking the formation of
shareholder advisory committees). CalPERS Identifies Corporate Governance Targets, Bus.
Wire, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bwire File.
221. Stuart Silverstein, Corporations Under Pressure; CalPERS Raps Big Business for
Neglecting Shareholders, L.A. Tudas, Mar. 21, 1992, at Dl.
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criticism of the $11.7 million package given to its chairman in 1990. 2 22
American Express announced a pay cut one week after meeting with two
top officials from CalPERS, who questioned whether Chairman James E.
Robinson III was overpaid in light of the company's long-term stock
performance.m IBM recently announced major pay cuts for its chief exec-
utive which may resolve some of CalPERS objections.?2 Dial met with
CalPERS representatives in June, 1992, and satisfied the pension fund's
management that its compensation program is sufficiently tied to corporate
performance.?
In another example of a negotiation success, the combined efforts of
CaIPERS and United Shareholders Association (with the cooperation of
mutual fund giant Fidelity Investments) won concessions last year from
UAL Corp.? The CEO of UAL was the second highest paid executive on
the Forbes 1991 list of big money earners. 227 In response to the concerted
efforts of the investor representatives, UAL agreed to give shareholders
more information on its compensation policies and procedures beginning
with the 1992 proxy season, and the level of Chairman Stephen Wolf's
compensation was reduced.? In return, the organizations agreed not to
initiate a shareholder activism campaign against the airline. 9
Several institutional investors followed the lead of CaPERS in attempting
compromise rather than proxy fights. These negotiation activities nearly
222. Chernoff, supra note 4. CaIPERS criticized ITT for doubling Chairman Araskog's pay
between 1989 and 1990, when company profits rose just 4%. In 1991, ITT's earnings dropped
nearly 15%. CaIPERS voted its 1 million ITT shares against ITT's slate of directors. The
Board recognized the threat and reconsidered the Chairman's earnings. His 1991 package
dropped salary and bonuses to $4 million from about $7 million. Araskog also received 170,000
stock options worth potentially $3.5 million, compared with options on restricted stock worth
$4.2 million the year before. Disgruntled Investors Show Chairman Who's Boss, Cm. TRm.,
Mar. 30, 1992, § 4, at 3.
223. Robert J. McCartney, American Express Cut CEO Robinson's Pay in 1991, WAsH.
Post, Mar. 19, 1992, at DI0, D16. American Express has tried to minimize the effect of the
meetings with CalPERS, but publicity over Robinson's pay appears to have played a role in
reducing his annual bonus, which dropped to $650,000 from $850,000 in a year when profits
nearly quadrupled. An American Express spokesman attributed the drop in Robinson's pay to
his failure to receive a long-term performance grant for the years 1989 through 1991. Id.
224. Chernoff, supra note 4, at 34.
225. CaIPERS and the Dial Corporation Agree on Compensation and Related Matters, Bus.
Wire, June 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bwire File.
226. Kathy M. Kristof, Regulators Consider Rules That May Scale Back Executives' Pay,
L.A. TwEs, Jan. 27, 1992, at DI, D6.
227. UAL's CEO earned over $18 million in 1990. Foams, supra note 1.
228. UAL to Disclose More on Exec Pay Under Accord with Shareholders Group, supra
note 3.
229. See Chernoff, supra note 4. The negotiation process has also produced settlements with
such concerns as Avon Products, Inc., Boise Cascade Corp., Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,
Colgate-Palmolive Co., General Motors Co., Honeywell, K-Mart, Inc., Lockheed Corp.,
Marriott Corp., Sears, Roebuck and Co., Unisys Corp., and Weyerhaeuser Co., to name just
a few. Companies Are Using Negotiations With Investors to Resolve Disputes, 23 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 532 (Apr. 12, 1991).
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halved the number of shareholder resolutions filed during the 1992 proxy
season. 10 Many investors combined negotiations with the withholding of
votes for board nominees as a means of registering dissatisfaction to
management.Y Although it is still too early to tell if the negotiation/vote
withholding technique will be successful over the long-term,2 2 it appears at
this stage that negotiations won more concessions in the 1992 season than
proxy fights evet have.
Fighting the proxy battle is difficult, expensive, and often ineffective.
Despite the withholding of votes by institutional investors and the massive
publicity presently surrounding corporate governance issues, of the more
than one thousand resolutions advanced by corporate management (on all
issues) which were included on the ballots during the 1992 proxy season,
only seven failed to pass.2 3 The shareholders' proclivity to vote with
management is a difficult obstacle to overcome. Although institutional
investors have considerable clout, their total shares in any one corporation
are not enough to win a vote hands down, and merely getting a measure
before the shareholders is certainly no guarantee of its passage. It is apparent
that shareholder resolutions by themselves are an inadequate means to
address corporate governance problems. Negotiated agreements between
corporations and institutional investors may be the most promising avenue
for shareholders seeking changes in compensation and other issues and may
offer the greatest cost-per-share benefit to all shareholders, institutions, and
individuals alike.
The new approach to compensation issues is creating a radically different
corporate governance dynamic with a focus on shareholders and boards
working together to improve both long-term performance and short-term
competitiveness.2 4 Institutional investors and shareholder representatives are
seeking neither to wrest corporate control away from the board, nor to
effect major restructuring. The changes they propose will not significantly
tilt the balance of power toward or away from shareholders. 23 Instead, they
230. Marlene G. Star, Proxy Resolutions Plummet in '92, PENSIONS & INVEsTMENT AGE,
June 22, 1992, at 3.
231. Id. The United Shareholders Association and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund used a vote withholding tactic, and announced
plans to do the same next year. Id. Votes were withheld at the meetings of Champion
International Corp., Sears, Roebuck and Co., Travelers Corp., and others. Id. CaPERS voted
against all standing Sears directors, citing poor performance and reluctance to change practices;
and voted against the slate of directors at Champion, in which it owns 0.8% of outstanding
shares. California PERS Votes Against Slate of Champion International's Directors, BNA
Pensions & Benefits Daily, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAptd File.
232. CaPERS may return to a shareholder resolution, strategy in the 1993 proxy season.
Star, supra note 230, at 3.
233. Id. at 39.
234. John Pound, The Glorious Oversight Revolution, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15, 1992, § 3, at
11.
235. Id.
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allow a constructive approach to resolving compensation issues. This move
has begun to strike a responsive chord with corporations,2 6 albeit with a
certain measure of grimacing involved. Regardless of whether corporations
willingly embrace institutional investors' suggestions, or must be dragged to
the table to talk, the process seems to be working at a time when little else
is having a significant impact on this serious problem.
CONCLUSION
Robert Reich of Harvard University claims that what we are now expe-
riencing is a legacy of 1980s greed.2Y7 Salary and bonus increases became
institutionalized by pay consultants and compensation committees composed
of friends and associates hired by CEOs, forming an "old boys" network.
The compensation packages they approve bear no relationship to past
performance, future performance, or anything else-except greed."38
Greed is a fundamental part of the American economic system, and it
need not be eliminated to control the overcompensation problem. Instead,
compensation practices should be revised and managed in a way that uses
greed in its most positive form: as a motivational tool to spur executives
to work for the long-term well-being of the corporation. High salaries and
incentive compensation are not in themselves evil. But the present system
is so out of control that compensation does not represent pay-for-perform-
ance, but greed run amok.
There is no single answer to controlling overcompensation. Self-control
is an ideal-but idealistic-solution. Some corporations may be trimming
pay this year in response to mounting criticism, but these reductions may
prove only temporary. Resort to the courts is possible, but presently
impractical and ineffectual. The legislation currently proposed will do little
to actually control compensation, and while the legislation is likely to
disappear, the problem will not. If this legislation fails, more drastic
legislation to dictate pay ceilings or methodology may be proposed. While
individual shareholder agitation is helpful, the few concerned individuals
are overwhelmed by an apathetic majority.
The most hope for real change seems to lie at the doorstep of the
institutional investors. These groups are growing in strength to the point
where corporations can no longer ignore their views. They have the resources
and expertise to make meaningful suggestions on how to better compensate
top executives and the incentive to work toward compensation programs
directed at long-term as well as short-term goals. Because each corporation
236. Id.
237. Nightline: Huge CEO Salaries in Hard Times (ABC television broadcast, May 20,
1991), transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCnew File.
238. Id.
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is unique, a standardized compensation formula is an inadequate answer.
Institutional investors have the ability to work with individual corporations
to seek individualized solutions to the pay-for-performance dilemma. At
present, they are the best available watchdog.
But the institutional investors need backup in the form of active share-
holder participation and support from the courts. The former has been,
and always will be, problematic, but the latter is possible. With the massive
compensation now being awarded, courts have the perfect opportunity to
find specific plans are unreasonable and unfair to shareholders, instead of
shielding excess compensation practices with the business judgment rule. A
concerted effort by institutional investors, shareholders, and courts could
uncover solutions to this intractable overcompensation problem.
